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Abstract
The trial on endovascular management of unruptured intracranial aneurysms (TEAM), a prospective randomized
trial comparing coiling and conservative management, initiated in September 2006, was stopped in June 2009
because of poor recruitment (80 patients). Aspects of the trial design that may have contributed to this failure are
reviewed in the hope of identifying better ways to successfully complete this special type of pragmatic trial which
seeks to test two strategies that are in routine clinical use. Cultural, conceptual and bureaucratic hurdles and
difficulties obstruct all trials. These obstacles are however particularly misplaced when the trial aims to identify
what a good medical practice should be. A clean separation between research and practice, with diverging ethical
and scientific requirements, has been enforced for decades, but it cannot work when care needs to be provided in
the presence of pervasive uncertainty. Hence valid and robust scientific methods need to be legitimately re-
integrated into clinical practice when reliable knowledge is in want.
A special status should be reserved for what we would call ‘clinical care trials’, if we are to practice in a transparent
and prospective fashion a medicine that leads to demonstrably better patient outcomes.
Background
Clinical research can be extremely difficult, especially
when the aims are to appraise the real value of interven-
tions that are widely judged to be justified by common
sense, but that have yet to be proven effective or benefi-
cial. This situation is common; it leaves a lot of room for
error and patient harm, on a large scale. Hence few medi-
cal interventions need to be studied with more rigour and
few deserve more support (from patients, physicians,
agencies or institutions), than trials which aim to deter-
mine the value of commonly performed prophylactic sur-
gical interventions. This becomes particularly pertinent
when the intervention carries a small but definite risk of
causing death or disability in asymptomatic individuals.
Yet the current clinical research environment has built
a system that makes such studies virtually impossible, as
will be exemplified here.
The Trial on Endovascular Aneurysm Management
(TEAM) was such an enterprise that failed. We will first
review the historical facts regarding the trial and then
propose some of the potential causes for this failure,
hoping to discover where things went wrong.
Perhaps some methodological choices were ill-advised
and we will attempt to identify ways that the trial could
have been more successful. Research that questions the
merit of interventions that are currently offered to many
patients but that remain of unproven benefit will always
be difficult, but if we want to practice a scientific medi-
cine in the best interests of patients this is exactly what
should be done. In a last section, we will propose how
this aim could be achieved: by recognizing a special sta-
tus for this type of ‘clinical care research’.
The TEAM trial
Endovascular treatment (EVT) with detachable coils has
been a treatment option for intracranial aneurysms (IAs)
since 1991. There is no dispute that ruptured aneurysms
(RIAs) need to be treated if we are to prevent re-ruptures.
A trial on RIAs, comparing surgical clipping and endo-
vascular coiling (ISAT), started as a pilot study in 1994.
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patients. ISAT showed better clinical outcomes at one
year for patients treated with coiling [1,2]. However
results of ISAT cannot be applied to unruptured aneur-
ysms (UIAs) [3]. With the use and availability of non-
invasive neuroimaging, particularly MRI, UIAs are
increasingly discovered as incidental findings and coiling
of UIAs has become the most frequent neuro-endovascu-
lar treatment performed in many centres [4]. A RCT on
treatment options for UIAs has never been done; most
clinicians and patients who have resorted to preventive
clipping or coiling of UIAs have done so on the basis of
fear of ruptures and purported efficacy in RIAs [3].
Because UIAs are much more frequent than RIAs
(approximately 1-2% of the population as compared to
10/100 000) and because the hemorrhagic risks of UIAs
are much lower than the risks of re-rupture of RIAs (1%
per year compared to 30-50% within the first year), the
main question, regarding UIAs, is not whether one treat-
ment option is better than another, but whether any risky
preventive treatment is justified. An earlier international
effort to register the results of treatments and observa-
tion in 4060 patients recruited between 1991 and 1999
[5] suggested that treatment was rarely justified and pro-
posed 5 year estimates of the risks of rupture for lesions
of various sizes and locations, but the study was fraught
with all the pitfalls of an uncontrolled observational
study [6]. There are reasons to believe that coiling is initi-
ally less morbid than clipping, but the long term efficacy
of coiling in prevention of bleeding has yet to be shown
[7,8]. Hence the main problem with coiling of UIAs is
that while the intervention is frequently performed,
nobody knows whether patients have better clinical out-
comes with coiling or observation. The TEAM trial was
designed to answer this specific question [9-11]. The
objective of TEAM was to recruit 2000 patients with
UIAs in 40-60 international centres within 3-4 years. The
planned follow-up period was 10 years.
A calendar of selected events is shown in Table 1.
The first version of the proposed protocol was pub-
lished in September 2004 [11]. Subsequent discussions
with the CIHR for 2 years led to minor protocol modifi-
cations that, given the ultimate fate of the trial, can be
judged inconsequential. In the meantime an invitation to
submit to the NINDS was, after consultation with its offi-
cers, and given the CIHR intent, declined by investiga-
tors. The CIHR ultimately approved the protocol in
February 2006, but requested that the Data Safety and
Monitoring Committee submit a charter with predefined
stopping rules before issuing a final decision. Support
was officially granted in June 2006, but the CIHR offered
30% of the budget requested. The investigators claimed
that such a large scale effort could not be launched with-
out some assurance that resources would be sufficient to
give it a good try and intensive negotiations over the
summer months led to full financial support for 5 years
in September 2006 (approximately $5 million for 5 years,
a budget felt to be insufficient by a factor of 3-6 by most
clinical research organizers). Trial coordination was to be
performed in 2 centres: Oxford for European and Mon-
treal for North-American sites. In 2006, the P.I. of the
Oxford centre applied for financial support at the UK
National Institute of Health Research (NIHR) Health
Technology Assessment Panel (HTA) for additional sup-
port, which took one more year, but was successful [12].
The ultimate version of the TEAM protocol was finally
published in 2008 [10]. Collaborating US physicians
applied in 2008 to the NINDS for complementary sup-
port of a national coordinating centre to encourage U.S.
participation. This would ultimately be refused, after
CIHR interrupted funding in 2008. A small grant was
also obtained by a centre in Brazil in 2008.
T h eC I H Rh a dan o n - v o t i n gr e p r e s e n t a t i v ea tt h e
Steering Committee, but the DSMC was composed of
fully independent, voluntary members using the frame-
work published by the DAMOCLES group [13].
Although letters of intent had been provided by more
than 30 investigators in 25 centres as early as 2004, the
official applications to local, regional, national Commit-
tees could not be initiated before September 2006. Offi-
cial approval by all authorities necessitated between 6
months (in French and Canadian sites) and 2 years (for
ethical committees and the UK Hospital’s Research Gov-
ernance departments). These delays, although excessive
by any standard, are nowadays routine [14].
Table 1 Calendar of selected events
Date Event
2000-2003 Discussion with peers regarding details of trial
design
2004 Initial submission to NINDS and CIHR
Sept 2004 Publication of protocol, version 1 (11)
Feb 2006 Conditional approval by CIHR
Feb-Jun 2006 DSMC Charter
Jun 2006 Official approval for a third of support
Sept 2006 Full financial support
Application to IRBs for trial initiation
May 2007 Approval for French Centres
June 2008 Approval for UK Centres
July 2008 Publication of final protocol in Trials (10)
Sept 2008 Letter of progress to CIHR
Application to NINDS for US Centres
Oct 31
st 2008 Unilateral trial interruption ordered by CIHR
November 6
th
2008
First International investigator meeting
June 2009 Trial Interruption by Steering Committee
2010-2011 Preparation and publication of final report
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planned to occur in Amsterdam Thursday November
6
th 2008, but on Friday October 31
st at 16h00 the coor-
dinating centre in Montreal received an email from the
CIHR scientific officer ordering, without any prior
notice or discussion with the Steering or Data Monitor-
ing Committees, interruption of the trial as of October
31
st 2008. The CIHR decision, made after consultation
with a secret, anonymous peer-review committee, we
were told, was based on an interim report (September
2008) showing insufficient recruitment of patients.
It was too late to cancel the Amsterdam meeting,
where participants were keen to continue recruitment.
A Steering Committee meeting on December 4
th, 2008,
voted for continuation of recruitment until a response
to our request for revision of the CIHR decision, and
until results of other applications were known. Discus-
sions regarding trial continuation despite interruption of
funding can be found in reference [15]. Appeal of the
CIHR decision was refused and in view of withdrawal of
funding, the additional support from the NINDS was
denied. The trial was officially stopped June 28
th 2009.
By that date, 50 centres were registered and 80 subjects
had been recruited. This poor performance can hardly
be explained by a lack of visibility: Between 2004 and
2009, the trial had been presented at 18 annual meetings
of 9 different major professional international associa-
tions (sometimes repeatedly), at 25 annual meeting of
19 national associations, and at 20 Grand Rounds of
various participating centres. In each country a colla-
borator was responsible for discussing TEAM at all pos-
sible regional or national meetings. Two press
conferences in Europe and North America led to articles
in 36 different magazines and newspapers, sometimes on
the front page of major public newspapers. The TEAM
collaborative group published 21 manuscripts related to
various aspects of the trial, scientific and ethical con-
cerns, and reviews on unruptured aneurysms in peer-
reviewed journals between 2004 and 2010.
Poor recruitment combined a) severe delays in trial
initiation mainly caused by bureaucratic barriers in
many countries and institutions; b) low recruitment
rates even in those centres that did initiate the trial,
caused by a reluctance of participating physicians to
recruit all or most eligible patients, and by patients’
refusal to participate in many cases. For example, a sur-
vey performed at the first recruiting site showed that
the trial was proposed to 55% of eligible patients, but
only 18% of patients that were approached agreed to
participate. Figure 1 show the time course of centre and
actual as well as projected subject accrual, and their dis-
tribution by country. Table 2 gives baseline data on ran-
domisation as well as number of outcome events (0)
and mean duration of follow-up. There was one peri-
procedural complication (a brachial hematoma), but no
disease or treatment-related neurological event in either
endovascular or conservative management groups.
Discussion
The failure of the TEAM trial is multi-factorial. All
potential causes cannot be reviewed here.
Before addressing some of the potentially generalizable
causes for the premature interruption of this particular
trial, causes that may be pertinent to other clinical
endeavours, the senior authors, who are primarily clini-
cians rather than professional trialists, take full responsi-
bility for the end-result. We could perhaps have done a
better job at promoting TEAM. Although most clini-
cians of the field acknowledged the necessity for doing
the trial, formal barriers and cultural resistances were so
numerous and entrenched that many thought the entire
enterprise was ‘ideal but, given the current clinical
environment, bound to fail’. Although this experience
may be used as an example of what not to do if the ulti-
mate goal is a successful research career, the present
article was rather written to explore what could be
attempted to make a necessary trial a clinical reality for
the benefit of present patients.
We first discuss some of the problems with the design
and some of the obstacles that were encountered. For
each problem, a piecemeal solution will be suggested, as
well as a global, revolutionary one at the end of this
review. As we experience these formidable difficulties,
the reader should keep in mind that the two treatment
options TEAM was proposing were entirely standard
ways of managing patients with UIAs, in day to day use
in all centres. The only difference from standard care
was that there would be i) randomized allocation of
treatment in the minority of patients willing to partici-
pate and ii) centralized web-based collection of simple
anonymous data on follow-up visits that are part of nor-
mal clinical routine.
Factors linked to the design of the trial
a) Sceptical versus enthusiastic trials
While all trials are built on hypotheses that must be
scientifically tested in the real world, some trials have a
power of seduction that others do not have. Some trials
fuel the hope that in a bright near future a new
approach, device or treatment will provide a chance to
conquer new territories. For participating patients this
may mean hope for a cure or a clinical improvement
when it was not possible before. For physicians the trial
may carry promises of new powers to help their patients
or to control a disease. This first kind of trials could be
called ‘enthusiastic’. Other trials like Team are necessary
because a practice is increasingly used while nobody
knows if it is doing good or harm. This other type of
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promise a novelty; it specifically asks for a rigorous eva-
luation of the true benefit, if there is any, of an interven-
tion people have already access to; hence it can only
draw on a sense of prudence and duty, imperatives that
are less ‘transporting’ than hope or enthusiasm. This
distinction grossly corresponds to 2 diverging roles of
science: scientific research as a platform for projections
into a promising future, and science as a normative fra-
mework to rigorously assess present actions. Marketing
of the trial to patients and recruitment could have been
easier if we could have claimed ‘stand up to aneurysms,
the silent killer’ the way some claim ‘stand up to cancer’.
This would call for a very different trial, a trial on the
benefit of screening for UIAs. Since the trial questioned
from the outset if therapy was beneficial, we could not
launch large scale screening campaigns, even if we had
the resources, to alarm a large number of healthy indivi-
duals with incidental findings, and to propose a poten-
tially futile, perhaps harmful fight against an
asymptomatic disease they did not know that they had.
Although we were aware some clinical research in pro-
static cancer or aortic aneurysms had taken such a path
[16,17], our aim was to assess if therapy, as currently
used in patients with incidental findings, was effective
and beneficial. Perhaps in the future a trial on UIAs
could be more easily completed if it was combined with
a trial assessing the benefit of screening, but such an
endeavour carries a much greater risk of iatrogenia at a
large scale. We remain reluctant, however, to promote
the success of a clinical trial by first instilling fear to
recruit patients, to later attempt to defuse it and reveal
how uncertain the benefits of therapy are. Hence this
type of research can only draw on a notion of prudence
and rigor. But scientific rigor and caution in proposing
elegant but risky preventive interventions are much
harder to sell than enthusiasm and rosy perspectives of
t h ef u t u r e .T h i sf i r s tp r o b l e mm a yb ed i f f i c u l tt oc i r -
c u m v e n t ,f o rt h e r em a yb en oe a s yo rp o p u l a rw a yo f
insisting on scientific methods and intellectual rigor in
human behaviour. Only an ethical imperative could pos-
sibly do the trick (see ethical issues below).
b) Loser trials versus Winner trials
A trial becomes more difficult to complete when it does
not provide some kind of concrete incentive to clini-
cian-investigators (’what’si ni tf o ru s ? ’). Endovascular
techniques are elegant, elective, fashionable and in many
countries lucrative for physicians and institutions. Even
when physician or institution income does not depend
on the number of treated patients, increased case
volume is desirable. The reputation of the centre or of
doctors, the designation of the institution as a referral
centre (with the correspondingly larger budgets),
increased ability to recruit colleagues, and even physi-
cian credentialing (for example in France or in Japan
which require a minimum number of interventions), all
forces support the notion that greater case volume is
better, if not for patients, at least for care providers.
Specialists performing EVT, like most surgeons, actually
enjoy their work, and questioning the value of their
i n t e r v e n t i o n si su n l i k e l yt ob ep o p u l a r .T h i sp r o b l e m
occurs in most ‘operate-don’t-operate’ surgical trials.
Success would have been easier to achieve if we could
guarantee that the trial would bring more patients to
Figure 1 Centre and subject accrual in the TEAM trial, from June 2006 to June 2009. An estimate of expected subject accrual is given for
centres having contributed at least one subject, based on a rate of one subject/per month/per centre.
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trial would potentially decrease their activity by 50%.
This reality led Houdart [18] to distinguish ‘winner’
trials, trials that could lead to a gain for the clinicians
doing the investigation (any gain, whether in income,
clinical activities, turf battles), from loser trials, such as
TEAM. One way to turn such a trial into a ‘winner trial’
is to make reimbursements for the unproved interven-
tions dependent on participation in the trial. This sug-
gestion, previously helpful in at least one centre in the
ISAT trial, seems to be verified with the recent success
of SAMMPRIS [19]. Although we suspect that in the
presence of fear, naive faith in technology, and unreli-
able knowledge, autonomous decision making is precar-
ious, this coercive proposal is bound to be controversial,
with concerns that revolve around justifications to limit
physicians’ and patients’ free autonomous choices.
c) The choice of the comparator intervention
The contrast between the two arms of the trial (active
versus conservative management) may have been simply
too marked to be palatable to physicians and patients.
Although both arms were to be clinically followed in the
same manner, with conservative management of risks
factors (such as smoking cessation, and control of
hypertension if present), and follow-up imaging as pre-
scribed by each centre, patients often felt the choices
were between being cared for and being denied care.
One solution here is to offer a drug or a placebo (even
though no such therapy currently exists) to support the
hope for being ‘treated’ in some sort of way. The other
benefit to inclusion of a placebo group may be to help
patients understand and believe that the ‘natural history’
of the disease is not as bad as they may initially think,
and that the appropriate intervention must be corre-
spondingly very safe, to the point that a placebo may be
appropriate, if we are to prevent large scale iatrogenic
damage to patients.
Another alternative would be to offer regular follow-
up imaging, although this is an expensive management
strategy; repeated non-invasive imaging studies are
costly, especially if they are repeated in a yearly fashion
for thousands of patients, and are themselves of unpro-
ven value. Such close imaging monitoring may be falsely
reassuring, since patients may still bleed between stu-
dies, or falsely alarming, since no one has shown that
even aneurysms that have enlarged must be treated.
d) Randomization methods
Because many patients who were offered participation
were already convinced something must be done and
because physicians were reluctant to question the merit of
their intervention, we could have resorted to asymmetrical
allocation of management, such as 2:1 or 3:1 in favour of
treatment, as in some other interventional trials [20]. Of
course the number of patients to be recruited must then
be increased; more importantly, this option gives the false
impression that we know active treatment is superior. If
treatment turns out to be harmful, every recruited patient,
at the time of enrolment, has been subjected to a larger
risk, when compared to 1:1 randomization.
Another method that was explored was a modified
Zelen trial, with pre-consent randomized allocation to
treatment groups, a method that had previously saved
difficult breast cancer trials [21,22]. A major protocol
modification would have necessitated protracted delays
in an already obstructed trial. The use of this method
Table 2 Baseline data on randomization, number of
outcome events and mean duration of Follow-up
EVT CT Total
N = 42 N = 38 N = 80
Age - yr
Mean (SD) 56 (10) 54 (10) 56 (10)
Range 34 - 73 26 - 78 26 - 78
Gender - %
Female 60 71 65
Male 40 29 35
Number of unruptured aneurysms (untreated) - %
18 3 8 9 8 6
21 4 8 1 1
History of SAH - %
Yes 14 5 10
No 86 95 90
Target aneurysm size - mm
Mean (SD) 6 (2) 7 (3) 7 (3)
Range 3 - 11 3 - 16 3 - 16
Target aneurysm location - %
Posterior 5 13 9
Anterior 95 87 91
Ophthalmic region 35 30 32
Middle Cerebral artery
25 30 29
(% for anterior normalized to 100%)
Outcome events
Number 0 0 0
Duration of follow-up - months
Mean (SD) 14.6 (11.0) 12.6 (9.4) 13.6 (10.2)
EVT = Endovascular therapy; CT = Conservative treatment
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seriously reconsidered if we want to somehow counter-
balance prejudgment, wishful thinking, the illusion of
knowledge or control, conflicts of interest and the cul-
tural resistances to necessary trials.
e) Uncertainty versus pseudo-knowledge
The trial was conceived as a ‘management’ or ‘prag-
matic’ type of trial, with inclusion of any patient eligible
for prophylactic coiling. Many physicians would have
preferred more precise directives, and more narrow
selection criteria. Some would have restricted the trial
to low-risk lesions (< 7 mm anterior circulation aneur-
ysms for example), taking for granted the value of treat-
ment in higher risk patients. At the same time many
others would have excluded the same low-risk patients,
claiming they could but minimally benefit from a pro-
phylactic intervention and could only decrease the
potential for showing treatment in a favourable light. In
the absence of reliable data and since both small and
large aneurysms were being treated in most centres, the
recruitment of individual patients was left to the clinical
judgement and ‘equipoise’ of treating physicians. It is
worth noting that the mean size of aneurysms in
patients recruited in Team was exactly 7mm, the sup-
posed threshold for risk of rupture [27](Table 2). Future
trials on UIAs may have to consider beliefs of the com-
munity, or the reassurance provided by arbitrary limits,
more seriously, no matter how weak the evidence.
The danger of course is that arbitrary limits gain cred-
ibility and is acted upon, both inside and outside the trial,
without scientific justification (see [16] for an example of
an arbitrary size limit to prescribe interventions in AAA).
f) The investigators
The Team trial required the same physicians performing
the interventions to question the value of their practice.
This easily leads to conflicts of interest, as discussed
a b o v e .O n ed i f f i c u l t ys p e c i f i ct ot h et r i a lw a st h a ti n
some countries and institutions, neurosurgeons not
practicing endovascular treatments were the primary
clinical decision makers, to whom patients with UIAs
would be referred, whilst interventionists participating
in the trial were secondarily consulted on endovascular
management of these patients. Neurosurgeons formed a
view whether treatment was warranted, and then if
aneurysms should be clipped or coiled. Once they
referred patients for coiling, a commitment to treatment
became almost irreversible in the minds of the clinician
and patient. Perhaps other physicians should have been
involved, such as neurologists, who have a better track
record at successfully completing trials. Being less
directly concerned by the merit of the interventions,
they could also have provided more objective informa-
tion to patients. Unfortunately at the present time neu-
rologists are infrequently involved in the management of
UIAs, a situation that could change if some medical or
pharmacological treatment was explored, in a 2 × 2 fac-
torial design, for example. Another potential solution
could have been to include a surgical arm to the trial, to
attract the interest of vascular neurosurgeons, but this
would have added another element of complexity to
trials aimed at finding the best management of aneur-
ysms [9]. A trial comparing surgical and endovascular
management of UIAs has recently been launched [28].
g) Investigator-based trials versus trials sponsored by the
Industry
In some respect the fact that the trial was not sponsored
b yt h eI n d u s t r ym a yh a v er e a s s u r e ds o m ep a t i e n t st h a t
are suspicious about conflicts of interests and hidden
motivations behind trials. In other respects it made a
trial deprived of the market forces and financial power
of multinational companies less credible, at least to
some IRB members, some legal or national regulatory
offices. Who would be responsible for expenses, for
complications, who would respond to lawsuits? Is the
enterprise strong enough to support its ambitious goals?
T h ef a t eo fT E A Mi sa ne m p i r i c a lp r o o ft h a tt h e i r
doubts were realistic, of course. TEAM did not have suf-
ficient resources to resort to contract research organiza-
tions, even those that are university-based, but given the
specialized nature of the intervention, it is unlikely that
such an organization would have had more success.
Factors related to legal and bureaucratic hurdles
The list of problems, conflicts and delays related to diver-
ging or contradictory rules and regulations throughout
various countries and institutions is simply too long to be
considered here; it has been extensively documented
before [29] but a few points deserve attention. Bureau-
cratic hurdles cannot be held directly responsible for poor
or slow recruitment, but they certainly contribute to
excessive delays in initiating trials. Up to 2 years (in United
Kingdom) were necessary to complete this process, where
centres had just barely been approved when financial sup-
port was withdrawn. This may adversely affect the motiva-
tion of collaborators and the momentum of potential trial
participants. As things evolve towards ever more stringent
and rigid regulation, research efforts will progressively be
restricted to profit-oriented enterprises led by the Indus-
try. The irony is that the rules and regulations were not
designed to obstruct academic studies or clinically perti-
nent research questions. Often, when reviewing regulatory
documents, it was impossible to identify the clauses that
applied to those pragmatic academic trials designed to test
management strategies in day to day clinical use. The exis-
tence of this type of trial seemed to have been forgotten
when the legislation was created [30].
In many countries, changes designed to provide harmo-
nization (throughout the European Union for example),
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were still in the process of being interpreted and under-
stood at the same time we were seeking approval [31].
This led to contradictory and sometimes erroneous
advice and requests from various authorities in diverse
institutional or national offices. Sometimes no one knew
what to do. Some offices could not figure out how to fill
out their own forms. Who is the ‘Sponsor’ of an interna-
tional academic trial? Funding agencies cannot act as
‘sponsors’ and various legal consequences were linked to
this nomination. We can only hope for real, in-depth har-
monization if pragmatic international trials are to
become feasible. National research institutes should
engage in multilateral collaborations, to insure that their
rules do not contradict each other and that RCTs addres-
sing current clinical dilemmas are not systematically
obstructed. For example, CIHR rules that forbid overhead
charges on transfer payments to other research centres,
insurance costs for enrolled patients, and up-front fees
for IRB reviews, contradicted rules in the UK, France and
USA, which mandate overheads for the Oxford Coordi-
nating centre, the requirement for special insurance to
cover patients recruited in France, and the frequent
requests from US centres for a $3-5000 dollar up-front
fee to examine the TEAM protocol. When harmonization
is not yet possible, then perhaps the institute providing
the financial support to the trial should be able to relax
some of its own internal rules to help international
efforts in dealing with other countries’ requirements.
Something must be said about research contracts. At
each institution a legal office, trying to provide maxi-
mum protection for the institution and their doctors
according to national laws, and to ensure research was
going to proceed ‘the right way’, tried to impose its own
local clauses. No matter how often we reminded people
that TEAM was simply a test of currently used treat-
ments, with randomized allocation and anonymous web-
based reporting of clinical outcomes; no matter how
minimal the monetary compensation TEAM provided to
participating sites, most institutions (including our own)
insisted on negotiating contracts that were supposed to
reconcile all the legal diversity of the world with zero
risk tolerance. This of course is costly, time consuming
and illusory. Is this really protecting patients? When one
considers that most centres recruited between 0 and 3
patients, these precautions were indeed excessive and
completely counterproductive.
More importantly, bureaucratic obstacles and the time
spent to overcome them now appear to represent a
major reason why clinicians consider clinical trials an
inaccessible, indeed illusive means to address important
clinical dilemmas. In some specialties like neurovascular
interventions, clinical research mostly consists in case
series and registries, and very rare trials. There is even a
recent trend to replace trials with large data bases and
powerful computers [32]. But how could recording our
day-to-day actions protect thev e r ys a m ep a t i e n t st h a t
are subjected to these treatments, which have never
been validated as beneficial? As things stand, rando-
mized trials cannot become a meaningful part of clini-
cians’ work and responsibilities; until this is corrected
trials will remain outside the culture of main stream
patient care where they should be.
Marketing of the trial
We have consulted 2 privatea n d2U n i v e r s i t y - b a s e d
experts on marketing, an aspect of the promotion of
clinical trials that is gaining popularity in its own right
[33]. The marketing challenges involved in studies like
Team are simply formidable. This problem is related to
the sceptical nature of the research question (see above).
We did not consult patient support groups or lay per-
sons in the design of the trial, however. Regarding the
preparation of information booklets and consent form,
we abandoned many efforts at promoting this material
after they had been repeatedly rejected by IRBs as ‘too
biased in favour of participation’. For example, a fre-
quently rejected sentence mentioned that ‘given the pre-
sent uncertainty, your physician believes that the best
option is to participate in the trial’. It seems that many
powerful people still believe that guessing (usually in
favour of intervention) is the best treatment that should
be offered to the patients of their institution.
Financial obstacles
The level of financial compensation per patient offered
to participating centres (mean $800 Can) was nowhere
near what is usually offered by Industry or even some
NIH-funded trials. It is questionable however if this fac-
tor alone had a large impact on the trial. Other impor-
tant financial issues included the fear of seeing
reimbursement for the treatment denied by insurance
companies in certain countries, or of a reduction in
income for physicians or institutions. In contrast, in
other countries where EVT of UIAs was not so com-
mon, institutions feared an explosion of costs for
devices, hospital stays and procedures. If money were
really a pertinent issue, vast amounts would be neces-
sary to compensate for costs of devices and procedures,
complications, potential losses in income etc... The logi-
cal source for such a large amount of money would be
to look at those that have vested interests in the results
of the trial: device companies, health care providers and
insurance companies. However repeated attempts to
secure financial support from the Industry failed. Unlike
pharmaceuticals, many medical devices are approved
without randomized clinical trials. In fact, all neurovas-
cular devices approved in the last 3 decades have been
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controls. It seems that our field is in no need for objec-
tive appraisal of the value of our interventions. The
involvement of health providers, private or public, is an
option that could be perceived with suspicion because
there could be a conflict of interest. Trials like TEAM
are not protected from conflicts of interest, however,
and support from a public agency is obviously not a
sure way to secure completion of a difficult but neces-
sary trial. Research projects compete for scarce
resources and an eagerness to redirect dollars to ‘more
promising’ research endeavours is always a threat.
Ways to obtain modest support for a feasibility or a
start-up phase (from local charities, local research funds,
etc.) exist, and have been successful before, with larger
sums being released by agencies once feasibility has
been shown [34-37]. This path may reduce the number
of years necessary to the launching of a trial like Team.
One problem is that as soon as money is involved, con-
tracts are usually required. In addition, we believe that
the ‘feasibility’ notion is a non-scientific, circular notion,
susceptible to endanger the trial feasibility itself: what
can we conclude from the failure of a modest, local,
unfunded attempt to initiate a 2000 patient, interna-
tional clinical research duty? [15].
Some have claimed that the only way trials like TEAM
would be successful would be to condition reimburse-
ment of interventional procedures on participation in
t h et r i a l .O fc o u r s et h i sc o n troversial proposal raises
ethical and societal issues that are beyond the scope of
this article [38].
More fundamentally the cost issue is vitiated by mis-
conceiving what this type of clinical research, which
addresses the value of current management strategies, is
doing, as opposed to research aiming at the discovery of
some future promising treatments. Where care which
costs ten times more is already covered, why should
physicians and institutions wait for more money in
order to assess whether they are doing good or harm?
[15]
Cultural factors
All the foregoing difficulties contributed to delay and
obstruct the trial, but we still have not covered the main
problem. Ultimately the major obstacle to recruitment is
a clinical culture, equally shared by physicians and
patients, which demands of physicians to know what to
do, whatever the circumstances. There is no room for
the unknown or the uncertain. As clinicians we are
trained to perform actions in a repetitive fashion. When
confronted with the uncertainty, our tendency is to cut
inquiry as short as possible, to make the speediest
return to actions we have been trained to perform. We
learn that such actions should be individualized to each
particular patient. We are trained and certified to
believe that we know what to do, even when we do not.
Our unjustified confidence finds resonance in patients,
who hate hearing from their doctors “I do not know”.I n
a clinical world where research is excluded, suspension
of judgment cannot exist. For each patient corresponds
a (felt) most-appropriate action that then, whether cor-
rect or not, becomes mandatory. We have completed a
circle: in the absence of trials, one must choose a single
best option in each case; once one is trained and
expected to find a best option in each case, trials
become difficult if not impossible. This culture is rein-
forced by a research-care dichotomy that automatically
makes research suspect and optional, while care is a
necessity. “Practice’’, according to the Belmont report,
refers ‘to interventions that are designed solely to
enhance the well-being of an individual patient and that
have a reasonable expectation of success’,w h i l e
‘research’, now divorced from ‘practice’, is defined as ‘an
activity designed to test an hypothesis, permit conclu-
sions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute
to generalizable knowledge’ [ 3 9 ] .T h i si sa sg o o dad e f i -
nition of science as can be. But how could we accept to
condemn medical care to an unscientific practice? This
culture is so natural, so entrenched, that it has led to
the exclusion of scientific and research methods from
routine clinical care, an exclusion that has not been
shocking to most people. This circle can only be broken
by an ethical imperative: medicine should use interven-
t i o n st h a th a v eb e e np r o v e nb eneficial; for clinicians
proposing unproven interventions, treatment may be
offered, when clinical judgment indicates, but only
within the context of an RCT. Perhaps we can reconcile
everybody by requiring that clinical judgement lead to 2
(instead of 1) favoured management strategies: a clinical
trial comparing these 2 options.
Ethical issues
The failure of the TEAM trial is an opportunity to
expose a fundamental problem that plagues modern
medicine, a problem which may explain why this type of
clinical research is most of the time not even attempted,
ultimately with grave consequences for patients: the
research-care dichotomy. Forged in the aftermath of the
research scandals of the mid-twentieth century [40], the
divorce between care and research deprives clinical
medicine of its science and condemns physicians to
practice an unverifiable medicine founded on beliefs,
opinions, intentions and intuitions rather than on vali-
dated patient outcomes. Upon careful examination,
most cultural, conceptual and bureaucratic obstacles
that obstruct trials integrated to clinical care draw on a
one-sided, biased view of the role of research in medi-
cine. According to this view, research is an intruder in
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future patients, a source of potential conflicts of inter-
ests that must be controlled. This view misses the truth-
seeking and truth-preserving normative role of research
methods essential in defining what good clinical care
should be, immediately, for the benefit of the present
patients. The Helsinki Declaration is more balanced and
clearly prescribes a duty of research when reliable evi-
dence is in wont: ‘The primary purpose of medical
research involving human subjects is to ... improve pre-
ventive, diagnostic and therapeutic interventions (meth-
ods, procedures and treatments). Even the best current
interventions must be evaluated continually through
research for their safety, effectiveness, efficiency, accessi-
bility and quality.’ (Declaration of Helsinki clause 7
[41]). ‘In the treatment of a patient, where proven inter-
ventions do not exist or have been ineffective, the physi-
cian...may use an unproven intervention ... Where
possible, this intervention should be made the object of
research, designed to evaluate its safety and efficacy.’
(Declaration of Helsinki clause 35 [41])
Instead of obstructing trials that aim to define what a
good practice could be, in the name of an ethics of clin-
ical research, we need a more inclusive ethics of clinical
care that formally prescribes such trials, for the sake of
protecting all patients, especially those currently con-
fronted with a clinical dilemma, and otherwise subjected
to the intervention in need of validation. Modern medi-
cine needs an account of the ethics of clinical care that
acknowledges the current limitations and risks of medi-
cal interventions, the existence of alternative courses of
action, and the necessity for verification of purported
benefits, up front and in a transparent manner: medicine
needs to reintegrate scientific methods into medical
care, and an institutional and bureaucratic system that
encourages, rather than obstruct, such a pursuit of truth
in defining a good medical practice.
A revolutionary option
TEAM questioned whether preventive coiling was doing
more good than harm. Its failure may be an occasion to
question whether all conceptual and bureaucratic obsta-
cles that have been devised and implemented in the
name of ethical and research governance are not them-
selves doing more harm than good. We can only pro-
vide here the canvas of a more global solution. The
objective of clinical research is to prevent errors; errors
in medicine translate into unnecessary morbidity and
mortality. The crux of the matter should not be to limit
the intrusion of science into medical care but how to
properly integrate clinical research and care that truly
benefits present patients. ‘Clinical care trials ‘ (CCTs)
are necessary to offer an alternative to current unverifi-
able medical practices and to counter the non-sensical
idea that good clinical care could be provided outside
science or that a good medical practice could be defined
with studies performed outside clinical care. Scientific
methods can provide norms to protect patients from
interventions that have yet to be proven beneficial. The
ethics of clinical care research can be founded on a
principle of caution: either physicians propose validated
interventions, or they propose promising interventions
only within controlled trials. The notions of clinical
equipoise need to be replaced by a notion of asymmetri-
cal uncertainty, with a duty of research when the con-
templated action has not been validated before. The
issue cannot be a fragile equilibrium, which of our
unjustified beliefs wins the battle whether at the level of
the individual or of the community of experts. The
notion of therapeutic obligation (which transpires
through most interpretations of equipoise) must be
revised [42]. Currently, when confronted by the uncer-
tainty, therapeutic obligation proposes the following
maxim: ‘When in doubt, indulge into believing that you
know, that you are good, act and get paid.’ An ‘obliga-
tion’ has never been easier, no wonder it is so popular!
The ethical obligation, of course, is in the other direc-
tion. The main issue regards the ethics of physicians’
beliefs and actions: we must require that beliefs be
founded on rigorous evidence to justify potentially risky
preventive actions. Hence we must start with an ethical
imperative not to act pretending we know when we do
not, but to acknowledge that our treatment preferences
are based on hypotheses that need to be tested. The
intervention can then be offered, but with an equal
chance of escaping false promises and be treated by a
validated alternative, by using randomization. If research
provides normative methods to care in the presence of
uncertainty, the care of present patients provides rules
to the design of clinical care trials. These can be devel-
oped as large pragmatic trials, comparing unproved
interventions with a validated alternative (or conserva-
tive management, when none exists), with simple, mean-
ingful clinical endpoints, and no extra test or risk
beyond what is considered normal care. This type of
t r i a li sn o tn e w[ 4 3 - 4 8 ] .T h ee m p h a s i si n‘pragmatic’ or
‘management’ types of trials has been on providing
answers that are applicable to the real world, most perti-
nent to policy makers [49]. This time, with CCTs, the
emphasis is on protecting current patients confronted
with a clinical problem. Hence the doing the trial is a
good in itself, a primary good that does not depend on
the final, scientific results. The fact that what is best for
current patients confronted with the uncertainty is also
what will turn out best for decision making is not for-
tuitous, of course. As long as the type of care that is
being trialed is already reimbursed, and if there is no or
minimal interference with care, no added test and no
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no need for separate funding, for time-consuming con-
tracts, for legal or bureaucratic pestering that will inevi-
tably interfere with the goal of the trial: to help
physicians provide prudent care in a context where evi-
dence is lacking. It is possible that what is needed today
was achievable decades ago [50] but has become impos-
sible. One of us believes that the ISAT trial, a turning
point in our field, could no longer be realized in today’s
world [1,2]. Is this progress or regress?
The role of public agencies and clinical care research
governance needs fundamental redefinition. The default
position of the agency should be to support the princi-
ple that this type of clinical trials is not a luxury, but a
necessity. To avoid a self-defeating process, peer-review
cannot be a competition between trials that are neces-
sary to the care of present patients. It should serve as a
consultation table to provide expert advice to improve
proposed clinical care research. Institutions should pro-
vide fast-track examination of clinical care trials free of
charge: they are essential to a good practice. The impor-
tance of clinical care research should be taught at all
levels (students, patients, institutions, local, national and
international committees), to promote the cultural revo-
lution that will make these trials the gold standard of
care in the presence of uncertainty. Ultimately any sys-
tem which delays and obstructs ethical research of treat-
ments which are current and widespread use but lack
scientific randomised evidence should be revised.
What are Clinical Care Trials (CCTs)?
The adjective ‘revolutionary’ (as in ‘ar e v o l u t i o n a r y
option’) is in one sense an exaggeration, since the scien-
tific methodology already exists, in another, the term is
a close estimate of the magnitude of what is needed to
overthrow the current obstacles to clinical care research.
The label intends to emphasize that the CCT is needed
to properly care for patients. This is not the place to
fully define what clinical care trials could be, but we can
broadly brush some fundamental characteristics: CCTs
offer the possibility of using medical interventions that,
according to current beliefs, or perhaps some pathophy-
siological reasoning, seems promising, but that have
until now never been validated as beneficial. At the
same time the trial protects patients from what may
potentially sway their choices and their physicians: false
promises, fashion, marketing, corporate or wishful
thinking. Treatment options are available and are in cur-
rent clinical use. The design of the trial does not include
tests or actions that are not necessary to the safety or
the care of present patients confronted with the
dilemma. Selection criteria are minimal, because the
trial offers a way out of the dilemma to all or most
patients in need. Patients are not used to show treat-
ment in a good light, to forward Science or Knowledge
for future patients; rather, scientific methods are used to
protect present patients from the illusion of knowledge
and extraneous forces and interests. Hence there is no
conflict between the interest of the present patients and
the knowledge that may serve future patients and no
possible ‘therapeutic misconception’ [51]. An important
secondary benefit is that there is no extra cost or perso-
nal beyond what is necessary to care for these patients.
Institutions and physicians participate, without requiring
extra monetary compensation, because it is the best
medical care they can offer in the presence of
uncertainty.
Conclusion
Trials like TEAM will remain extremely difficult, but they
will become impossible if the current trends towards an
explosive bureaucracy are not reversed. A special cate-
gory for this type of trials should be created, and the pro-
cess for implementing clinical care trials greatly
facilitated, if the community of clinicians is to be able to
correctly identify what could be a good medical practice.
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Raymond et al. Trials 2011, 12:64
http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/12/1/64
Page 10 of 13Expert Committees
Imaging Center: Dr Allan J. Fox, Toronto; Dr Alain
Weill, Montreal
Data Preparation and Masking Center: Dr Philip
White, Edimburg
Neuropsychology: Dr Isabelle Rouleau, Montreal
Patient Support Group: Dr Maria Angeles de Miquel,
Barcelona
Participating centres
France
Angers Hôpital Larrey (Pasco-Papon A.); Besançon CHU
Jean Minjoz (Bonneville J.F.); Caen CHU Côte-de-Nacre
(Courtheoux P.); Clermont-Ferrand Hôpital Gabriel
Montpied (Chabert E.); Colmar Hôpital Pasteur (Tour-
nade A.); Créteil Hôpital Henri Mondor (Gaston A.,
Blanc R.);
Grenoble Hôpital Albert Michalon (Le Bas JF.); Lille
Hôpital Salengro (Pruvo J.P., Leclerc X.); Limoges Hôpi-
tal Dupuytren (Chapot R.); Lyon Hôpital Pierre
Wertheimer (Turjman F., Lamy B., Tahon F.); Nancy
Hôpital Central (Bracard S., Anxionnat R.); Nantes
Hôpital Laennec (De Kersaint Gilly A., Desal H.); Paris
CH Sainte-Anne (Meder J.F., Trystram D., Godon-
Hardy S.); Paris Fondation Rothschild (Moret J., Piotin
M., Spelle L., Mounayer C.); Paris Hôpital Saint-Joseph
(Zuber M.); Paris Hôpital Lariboisière (Houdart E.);
Paris Hôpital Pitié-Salpêtrière (Biondi A., Bonneville F.,
J e a nB . ,S o u r o u rN . ,C h i r a sJ . ) ;R e i m sH ô p i t a lM a i s o n
Blanche (Pierot L., Gallas S.); Saint-Etienne Hôpital Bel-
levue (Manera L.); Suresnes Hôpital Foch (Rodesch G.);
Toulouse Hôpital Purpan (Cognard C., Januel A.C., Tall
P.); Tours Hôpital Bretonneau (Herbreteau D.)
United Kingdom
Bristol Frenchway Hospital (Molyneux A.J.); Oxford John
Radcliffe Hospital (Byrne J., Kerr R.); Plymouth Derriford
Hospital (Adams W.); Birmingham University Hospital
(Lamin S.); Cardiff University Hospital of Whales (Halpin
S.); Edinburgh Royal Infirmary Western General Hospital
(White P., Sellar R.); Essex Centre for Neurological
Sciences (Chawda S.); Liverpool The Walton Centre
(Nahser H., Shaw D.); London Kings College Hospital
(Jeffree M.); London University College Hospital (Grieve
J., Kitchen N.); Newcastle General Hospital (Gholkar A.);
Nottingham Queens Medical Centre (Lenthall R.); Pre-
ston Royal Preston Hospital (Patankar T.); Salford Hope
Hospital and Manchester Royal Infirmary (Hughes D.,
Laitt R., Herwadkar A.); Southampton Wessex Neurolo-
gical Centre (Millar J.); West Sussex Brighton and Sussex
University Hospital (Olney J.)
Canada
Montréal CHUM Hôpital Notre-Dame (Raymond J., Roy
D., Guilbert F., Weill A.); Montreal Neurological Insti-
tute (Tampieri D., Mohr G.); Québec Hôpital Enfant-
Jésus (Milot G., Gariépy J.L.); Vancouver General Hospi-
tal (Redekop G.); Ottawa Hospital (Lum C.); Winnipeg
Health Sciences Center (Silvaggio J., Iancu D.); Toronto
St Michael’s Hospital (Marotta T., Montanera W.)
United States
Chicago Rush University Medical Center (Chen M., Lee
V., Temes R.); Iowa University of Iowa Hospitals and
Clinic (Chaloupka J., Hayakawa M.); Houston The
Methodist Hospital (Klucznik RP.); Boston Medical Cen-
ter - Boston University School of Medicine (Kase C.,
Lau H.); New York INN Beth Israel (Berenstein A.,
Niimi Y.); Cornell Medical Centre (Gobin P.); SUNY
Downstate Medical Center (Mangla S.); Phoenix Barrow
Neurological Institute (McDougall C.); Charleston Medi-
cal University of South Carolina (Turk A.); Minneapolis
University of Minnesota Medical Center (Tummala R.,
Qureshi A.)
Germany
Dresden Universitatsklinikum Carl Gustav Carus (Von
Kummer R.); Hamburg Universitatsklinikum Hamburg-
Eppendorf (Zeumer J., Fiehler H.)
Italy
Milano Ospedale Niguarda (Valvassori L., Boccardi E.,
Quillici L.)
Norway
Oslo Rikshopitalet University Hospital (Bakke S.J; Kin-
dergaard K.F.)
Poland
Warsaw Instytute of Psychiatry and Neurology I Klinika
Neurologiczna (Kobayashi A.)
Spain
Barcelone Hospital Bellvitge (de Miquel M.A.)
Brazil
Rio Grande do Sul Hospital de Clinicas de Porto Alegre
(Stefani M.)
Hungary
Budapest National Institute of Neurosurgery (Szikora I.;
Kulcsar Z.)
List of abbreviations used
TEAM: Trial on Endovascular Aneurysm Management; EVT: Endovascular
Treatment; IA: Intracranial Aneurysm; RIA: Ruptured Intracranial Aneurysm;
UIA: Unruptured Intracranial Aneurysm; RCT: Randomized Controlled Trial; P.I.:
Principal Investigator; CIHR: Canadian Institutes of Health Research; NINDS:
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke; DSMC: Data Safety
and Monitoring Committee; NIH: National Institute of Health.
Author details
1Centre hospitalier de l’Université de Montréal (CHUM), Notre-Dame Hospital,
Department of Radiology and Interventional Neuroradiology Research Unit,
1560 Sherbrooke east, Pav. Simard, Z12909, Montreal, Quebec, H2L 4M1,
CANADA.
2Oxford Neurovascular and Neuroradiology Research Unit, Level 6,
West Wing, John Radcliffe Hospital, Headley Way, Oxford OX3 9DU, UK.
Authors’ contributions
JR and AJM conceived and designed the TEAM study and obtained funding.
JR, AJM, TD drafted the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final
manuscript.
Raymond et al. Trials 2011, 12:64
http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/12/1/64
Page 11 of 13Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 25 October 2010 Accepted: 4 March 2011
Published: 4 March 2011
References
1. Molyneux A, Kerr R, Stratton I, Sandercock P, Clarke M, Shrimpton J,
Holman R: International Subarachnoid Aneurysm Trial (ISAT) of
neurosurgical clipping versus endovascular coiling in 2143 patients with
ruptured intracranial aneurysms: A randomised trial. Lancet 2002,
360:1267-1274.
2. Molyneux AJ, Kerr RS, Birks J, Ramzi N, Yarnold J, Sneade M, Rischmiller J,
Collaborators ISAT: Risk of recurrent subarachnoid haemorrhage, death,
or dependence and standardised mortality ratios after clipping or
coiling of an intracranial aneurysm in the International Subarachnoid
Aneurysm Trial (ISAT): long-term follow-up. Lancet Neurol 2009,
8(5):427-433.
3. Raymond J: Incidental intracranial aneurysms: rationale for treatment.
Curr Opin Neurol 2009, 22(1):96-102, Review.
4. Cowan JA Jr, Ziewacz J, Dimick JB, Upchurch GR Jr, Thompson BG: Use of
endovascular coil embolization and surgical clip occlusion for cerebral
artery aneurysms. J Neurosurg 2007, 107(3):530-535.
5. Wiebers DO, Whisnant JP, Huston J, Meissner I, Brown RD Jr, Piepgras DG,
Forbes GS, Thielen K, Nichols D, O’Fallon WM, Peacock J, Jaeger L,
Kassell NF, Kongable-Beckman GL, Torner JC: International Study of
Unruptured Intracranial Aneurysms Investigators. Unruptured intracranial
aneurysms: Natural history, clinical outcome, and risks of surgical and
endovascular treatment. Lancet 2003, 362:103-110.
6. Raymond J, Guillemin F, Proust F, Molyneux AJ, Fox AJ, Claiborne JS,
Meder JF, Rouleau I: The Trial on Endovascular Aneurysm Management
(TEAM) Collaborative Group: Unruptured Intracranial Aneurysms. A
Critical Review of the International Study of Unruptured Intracranial
Aneurysms (ISUIA) and of Appropriate Methods to Address the Clinical
Problem. Interv Neuroradiol 2008, 14(1):85-96.
7. Raymond J, Guilbert F, Weill A, Georganos SA, Juravsky L, Lambert A,
Lamoureux J, Chagnon M, Roy D: Long-term angiographic recurrences
after selective endovascular treatment of aneurysms with detachable
coils. Stroke 2003, 34(6):1398-1403.
8. Naggara O, White PM, Guilbert F, Roy D, Weill A, Raymond J: Endovascular
treatment of unruptured intracranial aneurysms: A systematic review of
the literature on safety and efficacy. Radiology 2010, 256(3):887-897.
9. Raymond J: Managing unruptured aneurysms: the ethical solution to the
dilemma. Can J Neurol Sci 2009, 36(2):138-142.
10. Raymond J, Molyneux AJ, Fox AJ, Johnston SC, Collet JP, Rouleau I, TEAM
Collaborative Group: The TEAM trial: safety and efficacy of endovascular
treatment of unruptured intracranial aneurysms in the prevention of
aneurysmal hemorrhages: a randomized comparison with indefinite
deferral of treatment in 2002 patients followed for 10 years. Trials 2008,
9:43.
11. Raymond J, Chagnon M, Collet JP, Guilbert F, Weill A, Roy D: A randomized
trial on the safety and efficacy of endovascular treatment of unruptured
intracranial aneurysms is feasible. Interv Neuroradiol 2004, 10(2):103-112.
12. NIHR Health Technology Assessment Programme (HTA): Trial of
endovascular aneurysm management; a randomised comparison and
cost effectiveness analysis of endovascular coiling compared with
indefinite deferral of treatment in 2000 patients over 10 years.[http://
www.hta.ac.uk/1740], (last updated Ocotber 12, 2010; accessed October 20,
2010).
13. Damocles Study Group: Issues in data monitoring and interim analysis of
trials (DAMOCLES).[http://www.abdn.ac.uk/hsru/research/assessment/
methodological/damocles/], Examples of the DAMOCLES charter and
Charter template available at.
14. Dilts DM, Sandler AB: Invisible barriers to clinical trials: the impact of
structural, infrastructural, and procedural barriers to opening oncology
clinical trials. J Clin Oncol 2006, 24(28):4545-52.
15. Raymond J on behalf of the TEAM collaborative group: Reflections on the
TEAM trial: Why clinical care and research should be reconciled. Can J
Neurol Sci 2011, 38(2):198-202.
16. Lederle FA, Wilson SE, Johnson GR, Reinke DB, Littooy FN, Acher CW,
Ballard DJ, Messina LM, Gordon IL, Chute EP, Krupski WC, Busuttil SJ,
Barone GW, Sparks S, Graham LM, Rapp JH, Makaroun MS, Moneta GL,
Cambria RA, Makhoul RG, Eton D, Ansel HJ, Freischlag JA, Bandyk D,
Aneurysm Detection and Management Veterans Affairs Cooperative Study
Group: Immediate repair compared with surveillance of small abdominal
aortic aneurysms. N Engl J Med 2002, 346(19):1437-44.
17. Djulbegovic M, Beyth RJ, Neuberger MM, Stoffs TL, Vieweg J, Djulbegovic B,
Dahm P: Screening for prostate cancer: systematic review and meta-
analysis of randomised controlled trials. BMJ 2010, 341:c4543.
18. Houdart E: Debate. What have we done? What is next? Satellite
symposium on innovation and progress in neuro-endovascular
therapies. 10
th congress of World federation of Interventional and
Therapeutic Neuroradiology (WFITN). Montreal, Quebec, CANADA; 2009.
19. Derdeyn CP, Chimowitz MI: Angioplasty and stenting for atherosclerotic
intracranial stenosis: rationale for a randomized clinical trial.
Neuroimaging Clin N Am 2007, 17(3):355-63, viii-ix. Review.
20. Khatri P, Hill MD, Palesch YY, Spilker J, Jauch EC, Carrozzella JA,
Demchuk AM, Martin R, Mauldin P, Dillon C, Ryckborst KJ, Janis S,
Tomsick TA, Broderick JP: Interventional Management of Stroke III
Investigators: Methodology of the Interventional Management of Stroke
III Trial. Int J Stroke 2008, 3(2):130-137.
21. Zelen M: Randomised consent trials. Lancet 1992, 340:375.
22. Taylor KM, Margolese RG, Soskolne CL: Physicians’ Reasons for Not
Entering Eligible Patients in a Randomized Clinical Trial of Surgery for
Breast Cancer. N Engl J Med 1984, 310:1363-1367.
23. Fisher B, Bauer M, Margolese R, Poisson R, Pilch Y, Redmond C, Fisher E,
Wolmark N, Deutsch M, Montague E, Saffer E, Wickerham L, Lerner H,
Glass A, Shibata H, Deckers P, Ketcham A, Oishi R, Russell I: Five-year results
of a randomized clinical trial comparing total mastectomy and
segmental mastectomy with or without radiation in the treatment of
breast cancer. N Engl J Med 1985, 312(11):665-673.
24. Angell M: Patients’ preferences in randomized clinical trials. N Engl J Med
1984, 310(21):1385-1387.
25. Ellenberg SS: Randomization designs in comparative clinical trials. N Engl
J Med 1984, 310(21):1404-1408.
26. Marquis D: An argument that all prerandomized clinical trials are
unethical. J Med Philos 1986, 11(4):367-383.
27. Naggara O, Raymond J, Guilbert F, Roy D, Weill A, Altman DG: Critical
Methodology in Neurovascular Disease Clinical Research: I. Analysis by
categorizing or dichotomizing continuous variables is inadvisable: an
example from the natural history of unruptured aneurysms. Am J
Neuroradiol 2011.
28. Darsaut T, Findlay JM, Raymond J, the CURES collaborative group: The
CURES Trial: A randomized comparison of surgical and endovascular
management of unruptured intracranial aneurysms. Can J Neurol Sci
2011, 38(2):236-41.
29. Dilts DM, Sandler A, Cheng S, Crites J, Ferranti L, Wu A, Gray R,
MacDonald J, Marinucci D, Comis R: Development of clinical trials in a
cooperative group setting: the eastern cooperative oncology group. Clin
Cancer Res 2008, 14(11):3427-33.
30. McMahon AD, Conway DI, MacDonald TM, McInnes GT: The unintended
consequences of clinical trials regulations. PLOS Med 2009, 3(11):
e1000131.
31. Keim B: Tied up in Red Tape. European trials shut down. Nat Med 2007,
13(2):110.
32. Sox HC, Greenfield S: Comparative effectiveness research: a report from
the Institute of Medicine. Ann Intern Med 2009, 151(3):203-5.
33. Francis D, Roberts I: Marketing and clinical trials: a case study. Trials 2007,
8:37.
34. Sandercock P, Lindley R, Wardlaw J, Dennis M, Lewis S, Venables G,
Kobayashi A, Czlonkowska A, Berge E, Slot KB, Murray V, Peeters A,
Hankey G, Matz K, Brainin M, Ricci S, Celani MG, Righetti E, Cantisani T,
Gubitz G, Phillips S, Arauz A, Prasad K, Correia M, Lyrer P: IST-3
Collaborative Group. Third international stroke trial (IST-3) of
thrombolysis for acute ischaemic stroke. Trials 2008, 9:37.
35. The SoS Investigators: Coronary artery bypass surgery versus
percutaneous coronary intervention with stent implantation in patients
with multivessel coronary artery disease (the Stent Or Surgery trial): a
randomised controlled trial. Lancet 2002, 360(9338):965-70.
36. Dennis M, Sandercock PA, Reid J, Graham C, Murray G, Venables G, CLOTS
Trials Collaboration, et al: Effectiveness of thigh-length graduated
compression stockings to reduce the risk of deep vein thrombosis after
Raymond et al. Trials 2011, 12:64
http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/12/1/64
Page 12 of 13stroke (CLOTS trial 1): a multicentre, randomised controlled trial. Lancet
2009, 373:1958-65.
37. The CLOTS (Clots in Legs Or sTockings after Stroke) Trial Collaboration:
Thigh-Length Versus Below-Knee Stockings for Deep Venous
Thrombosis Prophylaxis After Stroke. A Randomized Trial. Ann Intern Med
2010, 153:553-562.
38. Houdart E: The need for new regulations on randomized clinical trials in
surgical treatments. Neuroradiol 2010, 52(11):1061-1062.
39. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: The Belmont report: Ethical
principles and guidelines for the protection of human subjects of
research. Washington, DC: OPRR Reports; 1979.
40. Beecher HK: Ethics and clinical research. N Engl J Med 1966,
274(24):1354-1360.
41. World Medical Association: WMA Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects. Current version
2008 [http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/index.html],
available online at.
42. Marquis D: Leaving therapy to chance. The Hasting Center Report 1983,
13(4):40-47.
43. Luce BR, Kramer JM, Goodman SN, Connor JT, Tunis S, Whicher D,
Schwartz JS: Rethinking randomized clinical trials for comparative
effectiveness research: the need for transformational change. Ann Intern
Med 2009, 151(3):206-9.
44. Vickers AJ, Scardino PT: The clinically-integrated randomized trial:
proposed novel method for conducting large trials at low cost. Trials
2009, 10:14.
45. Schwartz D, Lellouch J: Explanatory and pragmatic attitudes in
therapeutical trials. J Chronic Dis 1967, 20:637-48, [Reprinted in J Clin
Epidemiol 2009;62:499-505.].
46. Thorpe KE, Zwarenstein M, Oxman AD, Treweek S, Furberg CD, Altman DG,
Tunis S, Bergel E, Harvey I, Magid DJ, Chalkidou K: A pragmatic-explanatory
continuum indicator summary (PRECIS): a tool to help trial designers. J
Clin Epidemiol 2009, 62(5):464-75.
47. Zwarenstein M, Treweek S: What kind of randomized trials do we need?
CMAJ 2009, 180(10):998-1000.
48. Zwarenstein M, Treweek S, Gagnier JJ, Altman DG, Tunis S, Haynes B,
Oxman AD, Moher D, CONSORT group; Pragmatic Trials in Healthcare
(Practihc) group: Improving the reporting of pragmatic trials: an
extension of the CONSORT statement. BMJ 2008, 337:a2390.
49. Maclure M: Explaining pragmatic trials to pragmatic policy-makers. CMAJ
2009, 180(10):1001-3, Also published in J Clin Epidemiol. 2009 May;62
(5):476-8.
50. Cargill V, Cohen D, Kroenke K, Neuhauser D: Ongoing patient
randomization: an innovation in medical care research. Health Serv Res
1986, 21(5):663-78.
51. Appelbaum PS, Roth LH, Lidz C: The therapeutic misconception: Informed
consent in psychiatric research. Int J Law Psychiatry 1982, 5(3-4):319-29.
doi:10.1186/1745-6215-12-64
Cite this article as: Raymond et al.: A trial on unruptured intracranial
aneurysms (the TEAM trial): results, lessons from a failure and the
necessity for clinical care trials. Trials 2011 12:64.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Raymond et al. Trials 2011, 12:64
http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/12/1/64
Page 13 of 13